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AGRICULTURAL CRISES, CAPITALISM AND TRANSITIONS TO SOCIALISM 
IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA
By Reginald Herbold Green
A nation which is dependent on another country for the
food consumption of its population cannot but be a dependent
hostage of the particular country which feeds its population.
SWAPO of Namibia, Political Programme
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality 
of others may be - can only be transformed by detailed 
knowledge of it, by our own effort, by our own sacrifices ...
Amilcar Cabral, late President PAIGC 
(Cape Verde-Guinea Bissau)
If the people are to develop they must have power. They 
must be able to control their own activities within the 
framework of their village communities ... At present the 
best intentioned governments - my own included - too readily 
move from a conviction of the need for rural development 
into acting as if the people had no ideas of their own.
This is quite wrong ... people do know what their basic 
needs are ... if they have sufficient freedom they can be 
relied upon to determine their own priorities of development.
Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania
I
Crisis or Crises? In Production, Prices and/or Procurement?
The performance record of African agriculture over 1970-1980 is 
not satisfactory.^ While data are fragmentary and open to manipu­
lation, the broad picture is of an average rate trend of food 
production growth of 2.5% odd a year, versus 3 to 3.5% for popu­
lation. In a majority of subsaharan African countries there is a 
clear trend worsening in per capita food production and a rise in
2per capita food imports. For industrial/export (so-called "cash" ) 
crops the record is worse, with a trend growth rate barely above 2%
To generalise is dangerous - albeit inevitable in a short survey. 
Country records and experiences differ radically. So do year to 
year performances (eg to 1980 Zimbabwe agricultural output growth 
was below population) and those by crop (eg Tanzania trend annual 
coffee output growth over 1976-81 is 4.8% and cashew nut minus 12%) 
Statistical data are very weak, and hard to interpret without going3back to check coverage, primary sources and methodology. This 
is not a reason to avoid attempting analysis (action is being taken 
better that it be at least partly-informed action and glib, clearJ.y 
wrong analyses abound) but it is a reason for caution in reaching
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firm conclusions, for avoiding sweeping generalisations, for
looking at the particular and for a scepticism about the analysis
of others (especially if one "approves of" its conclusions) and
4self-doubt about ones own analysis.
Whatever the reasons, the production performance is not satisfactory
at sub-regional level or, for most states, at national. Given the
crushing foreign balance constraints following radical structural
worsening of external terms of trade, both the buoyant food import
and the stagnant export side of the current account scissors
resulting from agriculture are almost as serious as, or in some
5cases more serious than, the nutritional and rural income impli­
cations. Certainly weather (whether by worse average over 1970's 
than over 1930-1970 or by change in number of consecutive good or 
bad years) and socio-political instability (including war) have 
been substantial contributory causes. However, they cannot account 
for the whole difference between the achieved and - say - a 4 to 5% 
growth rate and, even if they could, there would be a pressing 
need to see how better output performance could be regained.
Terms of trade have been a major factor. Over 1972-76 and 1977-81 
a majority of African economies sustained halving of the real unit 
external purchasing power of their agricultural exports. Not
5surprisingly" this reduced their domestic purchasing power and 
explains why output of export crops has on balance lagged that in 
food. There is clear evidence of cross elasticities among crops. 
That is, shifts occurred among crops produced in response to altera­
tions of their prices relative to each other, albeit neither in as 
simple nor dominant a form as some commentaries, notably the World 
Bank's Accellerated Development in Subsaharan Africa, suggest."^ 
Domestic terms of trade shifts - whether measured peasant prices/ 
urban goods prices or peasant prices/urban wages - has not been 
uniform. While in most cases the rural side has gone down, thisg
is not universal (especially over 1975-80). Nor does there seem 
to be a simple correllation between overall urban/rural terms of 
trade and output growth. This is not, perhaps, as surprising as it 
seems: a) peasants cannot readily retreat to subsistence, they have 
established use value requirements they cannot meet themselves, 
and b) peasants do not usually have much 'spare' labour or other 
key resources at peak requirements times, so that higher real 
average prices alone are unlikely to call forth a massive overall 
output result.^
4
On the other hand, even it "getting the prices right" seems less 
central - and, by itself, less successful - than sometimes argued, 
there is a case for arguing that 'achieved production failures' do 
not relate primarily to peasant ability to produce, still less to 
'lazy', 'stubborn' or 'stupid' peasants, but are much more closely 
related to increasing weaknesses in input supply, transport, 
storage, procurement and availability of actually desired, non 
household produceable use values ("incentive goods"). Weaknesses 
in research, extension and technological change are not listed 
separately, partly because they were no worse in the 1970's than 
before and can thus hardly cause the worsening performance, and 
partly because on past record and present expert proposals they 
seem unlikely to be a relevant part of the cure in the 1980's 
except in certain special cases relating to seeds, implements and 
epidemic disease control chemicals, usefully subsumed under inputs.
i
Transport deterioration (closely related to fuel and vehicle prices) 
has slowed, limited or prevented marketing of produced crops (and 
thus deterred subsequent production). Equally it has rendered 
input and consumer goods supply erratic and untimely. In addition, 
Import constraints,, failure to allocate resources to developing/ 
extending appropriate seeds-toe1 s-disease/pest control programme 
and inputs and - in a majority of cases - "urban bias" on relative 
prices and/or allocations* of scarce goods nave naa simirar efxects 
in depriving agriculture (and especially peasant agriculture) both 
of the inputs needed to operate at the production frontiers knewn 
to producers and of the use values ("urban goods/services") which 
are peasant households' incentive to engage in petty commodity 
production. It is no accident that except in natural or human 
disaster cases (eg droughts, wars) rural food availability and 
nutrition has not worsened much - the secular increase in food 
crises or imports in Africa is predominantly urban.
Procurement - both public and private sector - has also worsened 
in many cases. In the first place buyers are less readily and 
certainly available and less likely to pay in cash on the spot.
Eg, in Mozambique the departing colons took the rural commercial 
and transport system with them, in Tanzania transport and financial 
constraints radically worsened rural purchase-collecticn-payment 
records of most parastatals. In many cases disturbances (economic,
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military, political) created "choke points" at which a handful of
merchants could take control of the process of commercialisation,
allowing monopoloy exploitation of peasants. Eg, both the food
12and coffee aspects of Uganda magendo especially at its 1980/81 
"high" as a dominant sub-mode of production, not a; secondary 
parallel market sub-system turned on the exploitation of such 
"choke points" as do somewhat analogous situations in Zaire.
Storage debacles - centring on failure to expand capacity and 
inappropriate selection of type and location - have worsened trans­
port bottlenecks by preventing smoothing seasonal peaks in move­
ment of inputs, crops and incentive goods and by forcing (or at 
least encouraging) some procurement agencies to move crops "early 
and often", not hold at purchase point until use point was clearly
identified.^3 They have also led to catastrophic losses -
14especially in the urban and national reserve subsectors - eg, 
600,000 tonnes physically destroyed, deteriorated and used as 
poultry feed or exported at one-fifth domestic food value to avert 
physical loss in Tanzania over 1977-80.
That these factors seem to have affected long distance (urban) 
supply more is not surprising. African urban populations have 
exploded upwards (eg 3% to 18% in Tanzania over 1960-80, 15% to 
45% in Zambia) but neither the public nor the private procurement, 
marketing and storage systems have undergone any similar structural 
transformation. As a recent World Bank Assistance Group report 
on Tanzania argues, the problem does not seem to be primarily 
peasant ability or even willingness to produce, but "modern" 
sector inability to procure, hold, move and distribute.
The state role in all this is complex - as the varying terms of 
peasant price/urban wage trends suggest. It is not limited to 
participation (and effectiveness thereof) in procurement or to 
"urban" vs "rural" bias, much less to capitalist versus socialist 
orientation. Three other critical issues turning on the state are: 
ability to keep an orderly stable state mechanisms of some variety 
functioning versus descent toward a "magendo" dominated rural 
commercial economy (or a wasteland ravaged by invasions in certain 
cases); ability to procure enough import capacity to operate the 
economy (including agriculture, processing, transport "incentive 
goods") at anything like existing capacity; skill in relating rural 
resource allocations to short as well as longer-term production 
encouragment and support.
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II
Toward A Rural Bourgoisle? For Better Or For Worse?
One approach to crisis resolution would be to back the emergent
African rural petty bourgoisie/kulak/functionary sub-class
alliance. This could be on a standard capitalist modernisation
16and production ideology , on a more sophisticated African rural
development/production growth/household-klan-state redistribution 
17model, or on a nakedly exploitative, short term interests of 
power holder approach like the rural side of Ngugu's Petals of Blood. 
In the first line of argument modern inputs in the hands of 
entrepreneurs freed of traditional and state restraints is seen 
as necessary and largely sufficient to achieve rapid growth. In 
the second, the progressive capitalist farmers are seen as adding 
to - rather than substituting for - pre-existing output, and as 
strengthening the income security of the rural poor by intra­
extended family and klan transfers.. In the third, concentration of- 
wealth and power is seen as the way to achieve rapid economic 
change and the breaking on non-economistic links such as obligations 
to family klan as positive in ensuring maximum.
However, it could also be an approach favoured by socialists for 
one of two reasons. First, that a capitalist transition was 
needed to create the productive force levels adequate for a 
transition to socialism, or second, to create the production 
relations and levels of visible local capitalist exploitation and
18of antagonistic contradictions necessary to achieve a revolution.
The ultimate problem with these rationales - except perhaps the 
last - is that the 1970-80 record offers little convincing evidence 
that a capitalist transformation in African agriculture is likely 
to be achievable, sustainable or effective in achieving a rise in 
trend growth rates to the 4 to 5% range. Certainly the data 
collected in the Annex to the Bank study show how rarely this has 
happened to date. The main variants of capitalist transition are 
"neo-kulakism" ("progressive farmer", "modernising peasant" etc); 
plantation and settler/"modern farm". Each has some striking 
short-term success - at least in its own terms - none looks 
generally promising in Africa of the 1980's.
Neo-kulakism has its best record in export oriented and especially 
(not exclusively) tree crop production under Smith/Myint "vent ror 
surplus" conditions!^ It has been the basis for most initial expcr_ 
boom changes in agricultural production in Africa (eg Ghana 1880-
1910, Ivory Coast 1960-1970, Tanzania 1960-1966, Botswana 1965-1975 
and with heavy state stock capital Sudan 1950-1965). But it has 
had a distinct tendency to plateau at relatively low levels, 
whether for external terms of trade, food and labour supply, land 
availability or ecological reasons. In any case, it is not clear 
that the neo-kulak element is critical under present and fore­
seeable African technology - support services - marketing conditions. 
"Pure" peasants with little non-household labour (or an exchange 
of labour among households20 ) are not demonstrably less effective 
at raising productive forces, albeit they are less effective at 
gaining access to inputs and markets in a basically zero sum game 
contradiction with neo-kulaks. Many of the latter in certain 
pcst-1945 contextx have been "economic activists", in trade or 
co-operative bodies, not peasants, before acquiring land, and have 
neither peasant nor modern farmer skills in land use.
The successes in raising marketed staple food production by this 
route are fewer. The Ivory Coast may be one (albeit less so in 
recent years, judging by GDP and grain import data. One reason is 
illustrated by the large-scale maize farmers of Ismani in Tanzania
- they were land grabbers and miners who acquired and ruined good 
land over sic years (poor peasants did neither) and moved on. A 
way to capitalist accumulation perhaps, but not to sustained growth 
of output. Similar problems arise in respect to annual industrial/ 
export crops, eg cotton (for soil type and economically viable 
commercial rotation reasons) and tobacco (because of fuel require­
ments) in Tanzania.
21World Bank and similar small farmer schemes, at their best, are
22in fact "neo-kulak" oriented, even if this is not intended. They 
do benefit some labour-employing commercial farmers. But they 
suffer from such high costs per care, such egregious technical 
errors (related to the data and analytical base) and often from
such large unanticipated negative output effects outside the
2 2schemes as to raise grave doubts whether their overall production 
impact is much more positive than their (clearly negative) in­
fluence on income distribution. The clear exceptions in the Sudan 
and Egypt do not appear to be widely replicable.
Plantations in Africa - including those peasant and neo-kulak 
shcemes so tightly organised as to be de facto disguised plantations
- always have higher capital and recurrent costs per acre than
neo-kulaks and a fortiori than peasants. Only under, for some crops 
and special conditions - sisal, tea and sugar fairly commonly; 
wheat, rice, palm oil, rubber less often - does higher output per 
acre offset these costs from a micro viewpoint, and even then the 
higher import component in costs (especially since 1973) raises 
questions about national economic viability.
The need to pay low wages (given higher ratios of other costs to
producers) and the authoritarian production relations pattern
create further problems in production, as well as socio-political
terms. Land is not in general scarce (especially around plantations)
in Africa; thus peasant household cash income opportunity increases
dramatically reduce labour availability. This has been very marked
in Tanzania over 1976-81 with special reference to the more un-
24pleasant jobs - sisal and cane cutting, and tea plucking. It 
also affects neo-kulaks and "modern commercial" farmers - eg in 
coffee picking at Arusha - but to a lesser degree.
The "modern commercial" or settler model has even less economic 
viability. Even under colonial conditions with massive preferences 
the typical rate of return on capital (after allowing a manager 
level labour income to the farmer) is -5% to -5%. This was, and is, 
true of Kenya and Zambia (where there are many African successors 
to the settler farmers), to Rhodesia and now Zimbabwe, and to 
Namibia and South Africa. Only subsidies, preferential access to 
inputs/markets and stock capital provision can keep this sector 
alive, let alone growing. As to do so eats up most of the resources 
available to agriculture (especially programme and policy design) 
the effect on overal output growth is dubious. That on external 
account (vis a vis peasant production) is unambigously negative - 
the import content is much higher.
The three capitalist roads all share two general problems:
1 . if successful as general agricultural output approaches, they
would create a 50% redundant population (ex-peasant producers)
2 5whom "they could not employ , but whose access to markets they 
would monopolise. Hardly a route either to socio-political 
stability, or to domestic market growth of demand;
2 . mechanisation, intensive input packages and large scale schemes 
are highly import intensive (up to 75% of retail price for 
sugar, 25% of exfarm for grain - vs 5% for peasants in the 
latter case - according to some estimates). Given the negative
terms of trade shifts since 1973, their micro and especially their 
macro (national external balance) viability is open to the gravest
of doubt.
Ill
Barriers To Classic Socialist Transformation Approach 
The barriers to the capitalist plantation road and the caveats 
about mechanisation apply forcefully to central state farms whether 
created from scratch, or by takeover of plantations/settler farms. 
The results of concentrating agricultural sector resources on the 
state farm (as opposed to communal or peasant household) in 
Mozambique has not been to maintain marketed output (indeed peasant 
marketed output has held up much better), nor to ensure urban food 
supply (imports have skyrocketed). It has prevented adequate 
attention to communal and household production and to supporting 
services (transport, inputs, procurement, supplies of consumer 
goods) for it, with an arguably negative impact on transition toward 
socialism and on production - a case increasingly made in 
Mozambique Party and state circles. While some state farms/planta­
tions have served specific purposes (usually in the contexts 
private plantations were viable) and do increase the public sector 
weight in the economy, this is not evidence of their useability 
as a control production tool, while their production relations are 
notoriously hard to transform to anything involving even sustained 
pre-socialist worker participation.
Both state farms and capital/input intensive peasant schemes 
suffer from the same problems of lack of data to make sound tech­
nical choices, low returns to capital and high import context as 
their capitalist variants. This is as true when collaborators are 
European socialists as when they are North Atlantic capitalist bi­
lateral or multilateral technical assistance personnel (a point 
equally valid in terms of the anti-participatory nature of almost 
all standard expert rural development advice with partial exceptions
in the cases of ILO, WHO, China, Yugoslavia and - in principle if
2 6unevenly in practice - Nordic bodies ) .
Not surprisingly, therefore, state farms are often as bitterly opposed
by peasants as capitalist plantations - and for much the same
27  2 8reasons. Both Lenin and Engels warned against coercion under 
such conditions as damaging to productive force and social relations
development, warnings African experience seems to justify.
Communal production of main crops has a record of unsuccess broken 
only by cases in which the crop was introduced, or first 
commercialised as a communal crop (eg in particular villages in 
Tanzania for maize, beans, tobacco) and there is no experience of 
household cultivation. For example, in 1979 1,000,000 Mozambicans 
(2 0% of probable peasant population) lived in communal villages, 
but only 70,000 (1.5%) were producing crops communally, and in 
Tanzania 95% of peasants are in organised villages with participa­
tory and communal structures but under 5% of agricultural output
29(possibly under 3%) is communal.
The reasons are technical or technico-iaeological. In a majority 
of cases nobody knows how to produce more effectively communally. 
Known low purchased input models are household based; most appro­
priate inputs to be added are either just as effective for house­
hold use (eg seeds, fertiliser insecticide, hand implements) or 
can be handled communally without joint production (eg oxen, small 
scale irrigation, communal storage). Known large scale approaches 
are purchased input and artisanal/managerial skill intensive so 
as to be - and to be seen to be by most peasants^0 - inappropriate 
and unusable. Thus peasants cannot usually learn the value of 
communal crop production by seeing examples - au contraire. As 
agricultural services (even when not biased against it) have no 
clearer ideas,and the village committee able on its own to work 
out a viable new set of production relations, land use patterns 
and input mixes is unusual (albeit unknown), the slowness of accep­
tance of communal production is not simply related to "peasant 
mentality". When there are clear risks of loss and no clear 
chances of gain, peasants would be very foolish to shift. The technical 
non-existence or inapplicability of the communal alternative thus 
prevents consciousness changes, and reinforces any existing attitudes 
antagonistic to socialist transformation.
Provision of supporting services (as discussed in first section)
by governments seeking a transition to socialism has been better
than average in respect to water, health, education and support
for communal invesment projects, eg in Mozambique, Tanzania, Cape
Verde, Zimbabwe. That does not hold for procurement, transport,
storage or input supply, and very unevenly for "incentive goods"
allocations to rural areas (Tanzania and Mozambique do make alloca-
31tions which reach rural centres - whether they then reach peasants 
is less clear). Whether their record is worse is unclear - private
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channel cost/surplus margins in Tanzania for main crops with no 
official channels (eg bananas, potatoes) are as high as, or higher 
than, marketing parastatal margins, urban food deficits are as 
serious in Ghana and Nigeria as in Tanzania and Mozambique. But 
the failures do publicly discredit socialism do waste scarce 
personnel, do create parasitic administrators and do waste public 
sector resources. That capitalist performance is no better is 
little comfort to advocats or would-be architects and artisans 
of socialist transitions.
At a different level, a series of consciousness problems arising
from objective conditions plagues advocats of standard Eurocentric
transition to agrarian socialism models. Most African peasant
households are not sharecroppers, nor dependent on large farmers
32in anyway analagous to Latin American minifundistas. Nor - 
except in the labour reserve economies and a handful of special 
cases (eg the Ismani maize zone in Tanzania) have they suffered 
directly from capitalist land grabbing. Except in the labour
3 3reserve cases (including those of Rwanda, Burundi and. the Sahel, plus 
certain densely populated rural areas) the degree of exploitation 
of rural wags labour is limited, because there is a real option 
of entering peasant household production. Therefore, there is 
no general consciousness of domestic capitalist landlord/employer 
exploitation even vaguely comparable to that in much of Latin 
America, Asia or pre-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. Such 
a consciousness may be developing - eg in Kenya and Zimbabwe - but 
does not now exist, and (as has usually been true elsewhere) tends 
to take peasant household oriented populist forms more often than 
socialist, ie China and Vietnam are no handier off-the-shelf toolkits 
than the Soviet Union (whether of war communism, the NEP or of 
collectivisation).
IV
Some Building Blocks Toward Communal/Socialist Transformation?
Must one then join the dirge - largely sung by well-paid expatriates 
who have no share in the misery, often condemn their own sub-class 
members' past advice, and can walk away from the s c e n e ^  - on 
socialist transitions, egalitarianism, basic service provision and 
production in rural Africa? The chorus has eminent members, is
broad church with as many left as right members and is the 
fashionable intellectual orthodoxy of the moment.
Not self-evidently. If one looks at rural development more generally, 
then results in respect to social relations, productive forces, and 
transition against capitalism are by no means uniformly negligible, 
let alone negative.
First, broadening community size through encouraging, supporting and 
on occasions requiring shifts from isolated homestead to village 
settlement patterns - a prerequisite to organisation to control any 
state or economic organ (as opposed to evading them) - has been 
widely accepted (especially ex post) in several states, eg 
Mozambique, Guinea de Sao, Tanzania. It has - however imperfectly 
and ambigously - raised peasant consciousness, self-organisation and 
power vis a vis the bureaucracy, and - more often than not - rich 
peasants as well as in many cases increasing women's self- 
consciousness, self-organisation and access to power-services-land- 
income.
Second, where seriously pushed (usually by socialist oriented 
governments) the improvements of rural basic services (adult and 
primary education, preventative and basic curative healrh inputs, 
pure water) has been very marked (eg 10% to 65% rural adult literacy 
in Tanzania 1961-1981). Presumably a better educated, healthier 
peasantry used to demanding and getting services it wants is likely 
to develop a different consciousness in respect to material con­
straints and to antagonistic sub-class and institutional interests 
- and to act on it. Four service areas (pure water, mother and 
child care, communal wood lots, universal literacy) - however 
intended - have positive implications for (ie against) subordina­
tion of women.
Third, the limited communal production of main crops is often 
paralleled by substantial communal activity in trade (crop buying 
and village retailing), transport, dairy herds and/or small scale 
manufacturing or servicing workshops. Even more notable are 
communal investment (of labour, material inputs and money) in 
housing, roads and bridges, water supply, health and education 
buildings, housing, small-scale irrigation, land clearing and 
afforestation (wood lot, crop bearing trees, watershed protection).
In Tanzania half the villages have viable communal shops, and total 
rural communal investment is at least $150-200 million a year (3 to 
4% of GDP and 10 to 12^% of GDP estimates of fixed investment which
exclude it). This suggests that a wide range of communal production 
and expanded reproduction activities are carried out by the peasantry 
in countries of socialist orientation with the likelihood of actual 
net communal benefits a key test (and as noted, are often inter­
dicting communal agricultural production).
Fourth, some state enterprises have demonstrated that improved
transport and procurement can cause explosive rises in marketed (and
in these cases probably total) output - eg the "new grain surplus"
35regions of Tanzania . Others have had dramatic success at pro­
duction promotion or support - eg the Tanzania annual coffee growth 
trend over 1975/76 - 80/81 is 4.8% whereas in the early 1970's the
agricultural advice was that coffee berry disease would wipe out
3 62/3 of the existing output. CBD was controlled, general husbandry 
(unevenly) improved and new areas given (still weak) access to 
inputs and buyers. There is no more a general record of managed 
market, potentially socialist institutional failure than of "free" 
market, capitalist road success.
To analyse what these patterns and events mean requires rather
mere careful observation and humility and rather less attempt to
fit African contexts into European historic sequences (of whatever
ideology) than has been usual to date. The point is not to avoid
reading Marx and Engels and Lenin, but how. For example, Lenin
on the unwisdom of coercing middle peasants and on the rationale 
37for the NEP as well as on the desirability of evolving a 19th
3 8Century US efficient peasant family farming system if possible 
are perhaps more apropos to Africa than most more recent Marxian 
writing. There is an equal need to read serious African theorist/ 
activists eg C a b r a l ^  and Nyerere^0 seriously with attention to
what they have argued and attempted in what context and why,
especially when it conflicts with European socialist applied 
analysis, sequences and praxis. In particular, misinterpretation 
of Cabral as arguing that the petit bourgois, as a class, would or
could in general (or even in Guinea de Sao) commit class suicide
by becoming of the proletariat, or Nyerere as developing an 
arcadian model to be copied rather than a mobilising myth (in the 
technical sense of that term) mystify and win debating points at 
a high price in obfuscation of the cases and contexts in point, 
and of serious analysis of the practicable strategy and tactics
of transitions to socialism in Africa more generally.
Certain basic theoretical premises may also require reappraisal.
One is whether the agricultural sector in most African contexts 
does or can generate a net surplus. The evidence on household 
cash flow and government transactions in Tanzania suggests a negative 
a n s w e r ^  as do physical productivity levels in different sectors 
in many African countries. This is not to deny the sector's impor- 
tanza in producing basic commodities and in transforming the sur­
pluses of other sectors into foreign exchange,and thus into specific 
fixed and circulating capital elements not locally producable.
But the answer (which is unlikely to be the same for all African 
countries or crops) is a critical one in policy terms, as well as 
analytical rigour.
Finally, if socialist transition is seen as participatory - in 
Cabral's sense as changing perceptions, consciousness and social 
relations - considerably more willingness to listen to and learn 
from peasants, and to consider sequences from their point of view 
is required. Hard-line production socialists fairly frequently 
ignore or deny this even more than pure capitalist intellectuals 
(especially if seems in respect to health, education, water). When 
they at the same time decry "socialism from above" an apparent 
practical contradiction arises which is not operationally resolved 
by asserting that the peasants suffer from false consciousness 
(even if the assertion is in some objective and contextual sense 
valid). The record both of agricultural experts and socialist 
transition experts in Africa (including African ones) is uneven 
enough and the results of their efforts unsatisfactory enough that 
the case for considering peasants as active subjects, not passive 
objects, appears rather strong even on the narrowest pragmatic 
grounds.
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NOTES
1. See, eg World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: An Agenda for Action, (Washington, 1981)'s tables and 
statistical annex and C. Harvey et al, East and Southern 
African Agricultural Policy Papers, IDS (Sussex) report to 
SIDA, 1981.
2. Cash/food crop is the traditional dichotomy but a very bad 
one, as the majority of African peasant household's cash 
income comes primarily from sale of food crops or animals for 
local consumption.
3. Eg, the share of commercialised peasant rice passing through 
official channels in Tanzania was near 100%, by 1982 it is 
near 0%. Thus marketed paddy has gone from about 70 to 225 
thousand tonnes but official channel data show 75 to 25 (state 
farm in the latter year).
4. The author makes no claim to being an exception to this rule.
5. Recent Tanzania data suggest some nutritional improvement over 
1970-80,while Ugandan rural data suggests that areas not en­
meshed in actual civil disturbances are not experiencing 
radically worse nutritional situations than a decade ago.
6 . Except perhaps - judging by some analysis and advice - to 
sections of the IMF and World Bank.
7. Raising real cashew nut prices in Tanzania about 57^% over 
1979-81 raised output 40% in the first year, but a 20% fall 
followed, despite the second half of the real price boost.
Cotton acreage has not declined significantly over 1970-30 
despite a real price fall of over 50%.
8 . In Tanzania, for example, 1967-70 and 1975-80 saw significant 
urban to rural shifts (eg over 1975-80 peasant producer prices 
rose at least 40% relative to the minimum wage and 60% relative 
to public sector salaries) while 1970-74 showed an opposite 
swing so that 1966 and 1980 producer price/minimum wage ratios 
show no real trend, and 1969-76 saw a reduction in urban/rural 
household income inequality. This is not typical, judging by 
price data in sources cited at Note 1, but is also probably 
not unique.
9. The contrary view has been argued - to a degree in Accellerated 
Development (op cit) and more forcefully by the Bank's Uma Lele.
1 0 . Whether bureaucratic, "free" market or "parallel" market.
11. This does not reduce the reality of the crisis, but does raise 
questions as to its causes.
12. Cf R.H. Green Magendo in the Political Economy of Uganda: 
Pathology, Parallel System or Dominant Sub-mode of Production? 
Discussion Paper 164, IDS (Sussex), 1981.
13. Horror stories of cross transport, back and forth movement of 
the same grain etc. abound. In Tanzania arguably 150 to 200% 
of the necessary tonne mileage has been used - in a context of 
high money and opportunity cost for fuel and vehicles.
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14. Contrary to conventional wisdom (except their own) typical 
peasant storage has relatively low losses and moderate quanta- 
tive adequacy, unless there is a shift toward longer cycles 
(more successive good and bad seasons).
15. Eg, basic public services (including education) may be critical 
to longer-term production trend increases, but not very relevant 
to short-term goals.
16. An expatriate example is E. Berg (whose basic position - some­
what watered down, especially by addition - is at the core of 
Accellerated Development), and an offical African one is Kenya's 
famous Sessional Paper 10 on African Socialism.
17. An example may be Botswana.
18. Both themes are present in Marx and in African Marxian writers 
like Samir Amin. Extreme variants - eg the ultraorthodoxy of 
Bill Warren for the first and the tactical capitalist road 
advocacy of some Trotskyites for the second - arguably distort, 
as do the "world system analysts" (notably E. Wallerstein) who 
argue that attempted socialist transitions sustained by neo­
mercantilism on the periphery strengthen capitalism at the 
centre and as a global system, and should, therefore, be avoided, 
(ie state power should not be struggled for).
19. Hla Myint, "The Classical Theory of International Trade and the 
Underdeveloped Countries", Economic Journal, June 1958.
20. A common pattern in tree crop areas with labour in and out 
approximately cross cancelling for many households.
21. At their worse they reduce peasants to penury (eg Fleuve schemes 
in Senegal) or are disguised plantations (disguised to outsiders 
not to peasants and managers/bureaucrats directly involved).
22. See eg T. Wallace, "Agricultural Projects in Northern Nigeria", 
Review of African Political Economy, November 17, January-April 
1980.
23. ibid.
24. This labour shortage is fairly good corroboratory evidence to 
the weak statistical data suggesting peasant household relative 
(and to 1978 absolute) gains.
25. In the period of the Miracle Ivoirienne, the Ivory Coast had 
a labour shortage - over 50% of all unskilled labour were 
temporary immigrants. The end of the labour shortage and of 
the miracle appear to coincide.
26. A participatory glass is often used, but the world seems to be 
defined as doing what others decide , or putting oneself (if
a peasant) in a new context more conducive to effective coercion 
and exploitation.
27. V.I.Lenin, Alliance of the Working Class and the Peasantry, 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, pp. 303, 355,
3 62.
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28. Quoted ibid, p. 228.
2 9 . The distribution is uneven - over half of villages have 
negligible communal crop production, perhaps 1 0% over a quarter 
and 5% over a half.
3 0 . Tractors seem to be an exception. As their gift for good 
performance often gravely damages a village's finances they 
seem to play (unintentionally) the role the gift of a sacred 
white elephant by a Thai king to an unloved noble did (ie, im­
pose a ruinous expense on a non-productive but non-returnable 
"asset”) .
3 1 . Horror stories of too much cooking oil, sugar, khanga in rural 
areas in Tanzania are not typical of supply realities, but they 
do happen on occasion precisely because allocations to rural 
areas do exist in practice as well as on paper.
32. There are exceptions to this "rule".
3 3 . In these cases the land the labour surplus are in different 
states.
3 4 . Precisely because the author is too committted for too long to 
feel able to walk away he is doubtless prone to the opposite 
error of objectively excessive hopefulness at the level of will, 
if not necessarily of intellect.
3 5 . This type of neo-vent for surplus output enhancement does pose 
problems (especially since 1973) in respect to transport costs.
36. 1975/76 - 1980/31 daca are used to have a peak year to peak 
year comparison. 1975/76 was above 1970/71.
3 7 . oo cit, pp. 235, 354, 396 ff.
38. ibid, p. 183.
3 9 . For an introduction see Basil Davidson "On Revolutionary 
Nationalism: The Legacy of Cabral", in C. Stewart and L. Denzer, 
Radicalism in West Africa, Sage 1982.
40. See three volumes of speeches published by Oxford University 
Press, Dar es Salaam and The Arusha Declaration - Ten Years 
After, Government Printer, 1977.
41. Evidence compiled by J. Wagao in unpublished 1981 University 
of Sussex PhD thesis on income distribution in Tanzania.
Note: Numerous other sources and experiences beyond those cited 
specifically have been used. Particularly valuable were 
many of the papers for the April 1982 Review of African 
Political Economy - Department of Politics and African 
Studies Unit, University of Leeds organised "Transition 
to Socialism in Africa" Conference.
